The open nature of the wireless medium leaves it
vulnerable to intentional interference attacks, typically referred
to as jamming. This intentional interference with wireless
transmissions can be used as a launch pad for mounting
Denial-of-Service attacks on wireless networks. Typically,
jamming has been addressed under an external threat model.
However, adversaries with internal knowledge of protocol
specifications and network secrets can launch low-effort
jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. In this
work, the problem of selective jamming attacks in wireless
networks is addressed. In these attacks, the adversary is active
only for a short period of time, selectively targeting messages
of high importance. The advantages of selective jamming in
terms of network performance degradation and adversary
effort by presenting two case studies; a selective attack on TCP
and one on routing are illustrated. The selective jamming
attacks can be launched by performing real-time packet
classification at the physical layer is shown. To mitigate these
attacks, the three schemes that prevent real-time packet
classification by combining cryptographic primitives with
physical-layer attributes are developed. The security of the
methods and evaluating the computational and communication
overhead is analyzed.
Published In : IJCSN Journal Volume 3, Issue 3
Date of Publication : 01 June 2014
Pages : 99 - 111
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Publication Link : Combining Cryptographic Primitive to Prevent Selective
Jamming Attacks
The problem of selective jamming attacks in wireless
networks is addressed. An internal adversary model is
considered in which the jammer is part of the network
under attack, thus being aware of the protocol
specifications and shared network secrets. The jammer
can classify transmitted packets in real time by decoding
the first few symbols of an ongoing transmission is shown. The impact of selective jamming attacks on
network protocols such as TCP and routing is evaluated.
Our findings show that selective jammers can
significantly impact performance with very low effort.
Three schemes that transform a selective jammer to a
random one by preventing real-time packet classification
are developed. Our schemes combine cryptographic
primitives such as commitment schemes, cryptographic
puzzles, and all-or-nothing transformations (AONTs)
with physical layer characteristics. The security of our
schemes and quantified their computational and
communication overhead is analyzed.
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