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  Banks & E-Commerce Network Security Threats and Best Policies in Practice  
  Authors : Adam Ali.Zare Hudaib
  Cite as:

 

This increase in e-commerce has driven the need to create an online payment system. Unfortunately, there are a lot of flaws and internet frauds. Cyber-criminals have benefited from on-line banking (OB). We try to predict how hacking tools might evolve. We briefly survey the state-of-the-art tools developed by black-hat hackers and conclude that they could be automated dramatically. To demonstrate the feasibility of our predictions and prove that many two-factor authentication schemes can be bypassed, we have analysed banking and modern payments system security. In this research we review different payment protocols and security methods that are being used to run banking systems. We survey some of the popular systems that are being used today, with a deeper focus on the chips, cards, NFC, authentication etc. In addition, we also discuss the weaknesses in the systems that can compromise the customer's trust.

 

Published In : IJCSN Journal Volume 3, Issue 4

Date of Publication : August 2014

Pages : 266 - 278

Figures : 01

Tables : --

Publication Link : Banks & E-Commerce Network Security Threats and Best Policies in Practice

 

 

 

Adam Ali.Zare Hudaib : Licensed Penetration Tester, CEH , ECSA , LPT , WCNA, "2.MAS" Poland . Lublin 20-032

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Banking security

authentication

chip and PIN

e-payment

security protocol

bitcoin

NFC

Assessing the security of Internet banking applications requires specialized knowledge on vulnerabilities, attacks and countermeasures, to gain an understanding of the threats, how they are realized and how to address them. The case study in this article demonstrated that the use of the attack tree should facilitate the work of auditors, security consultants or security officers who wish to conduct a security assessment of an Internet banking authentication mechanism. We presented our analysis of banking and modern payments system security, E-payment, as an example of security challenges in third-party service integration. We found serious logic flaws in leading online, mobile, e-commerce etc. banking applications, leading merchant applications, popular online stores and payment providers (i.e., PayPal). We discussed the weaknesses in the systems that can compromise the customer's trust. Although, we showed and analyzed ways of defense from security threats.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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