Security researchers in Controller Area Networks (CAN) have addressed attacks targeting authentication, without being
concerned about neither the protocol complexity nor the busload overhead. In this research, Rule-based CAN Transceiver (RbT) is
introduced, proposing a security protocol targeting the validation of a set of rules, in addition to respecting real-time constraints in
modern automotive CAN networks, and providing negligible busload overhead. In this research, modified CAN Transceiver hardware
node is added to the network, acting as a network guard. Each node in the network will have to initiate a secure channel with RbT node,
and during normal mode operation, the nodes will transmit a Message Authentication Code (MAC) as part of the data frame, with the
MAC targeted to the RbT node. MAC will be built and validated based on a set of defined rules. RbT node will prevent the nodes from
receiving the frame in case of invalid MAC by the transmission of CAN error frame, otherwise, it will allow normal frame reception by
the network nodes. The protocol concept is proved and the busload overhead is implemented and proved using CANoe from Vector.
Published In:IJCSN Journal Volume 7, Issue 1
Date of Publication : February 2018
Pages : 14-17
Tables : 05
Khaled NAGA : received BSc degree in Electronics and
Communication Engineering from Faculty of Engineering, Ain
Shams University, Cairo, Egypt in 2008. He is a Software Architect
and a Technical Consultant in Avelabs Egypt working for
Automotive Tier-1 and Tier-2 companies including Delphi
Automotive, Continental, Elektrobit, and Autoliv. He was a
Principal Software Engineer in Valeo and IBM. He is also an
experienced instructor conducting Embedded Systems specialized
training in Delphi Automotive in the USA and several engineering
institutes in Egypt including Information Technology Institute (ITI).
His research interest includes embedded systems, real-time
design, compilers, AUTOSAR, security, and automotive networks.
Ashraf TAMMAM : received BSc degree in Computer Engineering
from Military Technical College (MTC), Cairo, Egypt in 1994. And
received his MSc and Ph.D. degrees in Computer and Systems
Engineering from Faculty of Engineering, Ain Shams University,
Cairo, Egypt in 2004 and 2011 respectively. He is an Assistant
Professor of Computer Engineering at Arab Academy for Science,
Technology & Maritime Transport (AASTMT), Cairo, Egypt. He
was the Chairman of Information and Decision Support Center
(IDSC), Egyptian Cabinet in 2014. His research interest includes
computer networks, security, and cloud computing.
Abdelmoneim WAHDAN : received BSc and MSc degrees in
Computer Engineering from Faculty of Engineering, Ain Shams
University, Cairo, Egypt in 1968 and 1972 respectively. And
received his Ph.D. degree from École Centrale de Nantes, France
in 1978. Since that, he worked as Assistant, Associate, and Full
Professor of Systems and Computer Engineering in Faculty of
Engineering, Ain Shams University, and on leave in KSU Saudi
Arabia during 1985 to 1990. Professor Wahdan supervised many
MSc and Ph.D. degrees in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and France during
his long career. And currently, he is with Computer Engineering
department AASTMT, Cairo, Egypt. His research interest includes
computer networks, computer hardware, embedded systems,
automatic control, security, robotics, and other related areas.
Automotive, Security, Controller Area Networks (CAN), Transceivers
RbT Protocol is a proposed hardware-based solution that
depends on a new modified CAN transceiver. RbT MAC
generation and verification rules are based on sender's
parameters and the transmitted message parameters,
ensuring protection against attacks targeting messages'
authentication, authentication, and authorization of the
sender nodes. RbT is proved to add negligible busload
overhead while respecting strict real-time response
constraints. RbT is shown to provide much better busload
overhead results than the studied software-based protocols,
and a better busload overhead results over the studied
hardware-based protocol. In addition, RbT protocol is
invulnerable against MITM attacks unlike CaCAN
protocol due to the sender node authentication applied in
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